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I Comments
The Pennsylvania Real Estate Licensing




You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and
will be used against you during the contract negotiations. You have
the right to be represented by your own agent. If you choose not to
be represented by your own agent, all agents will represent the
seller and attempt to get the highest possible price for their client.
Do you understand these rights, Mr. and Mrs. Buyer?I
A Miranda-style warning for potential buyers-an ironically true
portrayal of the current world of real estate. Everyday thousands of
* J.D. Candidate, Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University,
2003. The author would like to thank Larry Catd Backer, Professor of Law at the
Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University, Jason Cincilla, and
Gary L. Coles for their ideas and support.
1. Deborah Leigh Wood, Nailing It Down, How a Broker Can Build a New
Construction Deal, CHI. SuN-TmEs, Apr. 5, 1996, at 1, available at 1996 WL 6739332
(quoting Roger Lautt, a broker with Remax Exclusive Properties, who explains real
estate agency and disclosure to buyers this way).
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consumers are faced with a confusing real estate disclosure like the one
above, and they are forced to make complex choices about their
representation. In the past it was simple-brokers2 represented sellers.3
As real estate practice changed, and courts across the country expanded
brokers' duties to include duties to buyers,4 legislatures responded with
added disclosure requirements and codified arrangements of agency
relationships for brokers.5 Instead of correcting the true problem of
confusion by buyers, these disclosures and arrangements only added
complexity for brokers and consumers.
In 1998, Pennsylvania (hereinafter also referred to as the
"Commonwealth") amended its Real Estate Licensing Act 6 to reflect
the changing nature of the real estate market and the expectations of
real estate consumers. Following the lead of many other states, the
Commonwealth adopted Act 112 of 1998 (hereinafter Act 112), 7 which
contains provisions for agency relationships such as dual agency and
2. Pennsylvania's Real Estate Licensing Act defines a "broker" as
Any person who, for another and for a fee, commission or other valuable
consideration:
(1) negotiates with or aids any person in locating or obtaining for purchase,
lease or an acquisition of interest in any real estate;
(2) negotiates the listing, sale, purchase, exchange, lease, time share and
similarly designated interests, financing or option for any real estate;
(3) manages any real estate;
(4) represents himself to be a real estate consultant, counsellor, agent or
finder;
(5) undertakes to promote the sale, exchange, purchase or rental of real estate:
Provided, however, That this provision shall not include any person whose
main business is that of advertising, promotion or public relations;
(5.1) undertakes to perform a comparative market analysis; or
(6) attempts to perform any of the above acts.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.201 (West 2002).
3. See Ronald Benton Brown & Joseph M. Grohman, Goodbuy Dual World. Real
Estate Brokerage Changes Again, but Not Enough, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1997, at 54
(explaining how the listing broker would contract with the seller while brokers who
found the buyer were subagents also representing the seller).
4. See Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205 (Ct. App. 1963); see also
Dismuke v. Edina Realty, Inc., No. 92-8716, 1993 WL 327771, at *3 (D. Minn. June
17, 1993); Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 390 (Ct. App. 1984); George v.
Williams, 580 P.2d 1357 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978).
5. From 1987 to the present, every state has amended its law to provide some
clarification as to broker agency relationships. Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska,
New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin as well as other states
permit (or have permitted) some new types of agency, such as dual or transactional
licensees. See NAT'L Ass'N OF REALTORS, STATE AGENCY MATRIX (2001).
6. Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§
455.101-.701 (West 2002).
7. Act of Nov. 25, 1998, P.L. 908, 1998 Pa. Laws 112 (codified as amended at
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 455.101-.701 (West 2002)).
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transactional licensee, as well as added disclosure requirements for
brokers to their consumers.8
This comment discusses the new requirements that Act 112 places
on brokers and the implications of these requirements on brokers and
consumers. First, part II will review the development of real estate law
prior to Act 112. Emphasis will be placed on developments in common
practice, case law, and statutory provisions. Part III will discuss
Pennsylvania's Act 112 and the way it changed the requirements for
brokers. Part IV will compare the Pennsylvania statute with those of
other states that have amended their real estate licensing acts to allow
for additional agency relationships and disclosures. Part V will explore
some of the more important consequences of Act 112 and provide
suggestions for future amendments. Part VI will conclude that brokers
and consumers could benefit from amendments that simplify the current
law.
II. Development of Real Estate Law in Pennsylvania
A. Consumer Expectations and the National Perspective
For most of the twentieth century, real estate brokers generally
worked exclusively for the seller of real estate.9 A seller would list a
property with a broker; the broker would then enter it into a "Multiple
Listing Service" so that information on the property was available to
other brokers in the region.l0 If an outside broker brought a prospective
buyer to the property, that broker was considered a subagent of the
seller, and was compensated by the seller just like the listing broker. "
Unless the buyer and the outside broker had a contractual relationship
for compensation, the broker received a portion of the listing broker's
commission.'
2
Although it may have been clear to both the seller and the broker
that the seller was the sole party represented in a transaction, most
people purchasing real estate assumed that a broker who was "helping"
them was working for them.' 3 "A 1980s national study by the Federal
8. Id.
9. Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§
455.101-.701 (West 1997) (amended 1998).
10. Collins v. Main Line Bd. of Realtors, 304 A.2d 493, 494 (Pa. 1973) ("All
exclusive listings of all members are then centrally pooled and made available to all
other [MLS] members to sell.").
11. Grant v. Purdy, 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 42, 45 (Delaware 1974) ("A cooperating
broker is, in reality, a subagent.").
12. Id.
13. Vernon L. Jarboe, Brokerage Relationships in Real Estate Transaction Act, J.
2002]
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Trade Commission found 70 percent of consumers did not know the
real estate broker was working for the seller."' 14 Many buyers failed to
understand that the broker who found numerous homes to view, spent
endless time with the buyer, and helped the buyer with paperwork,
offers, and mortgages was actually working for the other party.' 5
This misunderstanding by buyers led to many lawsuits against
brokers and to decisions by courts throughout the country expanding
the roles of brokers in an effort to accommodate these injured buyers. 16
For example, the California Court of Appeals extended brokers' duties
to include certain duties to the buyer who was not represented by the
broker. 17 Furthermore, the Missouri Court of Appeals decided that an
agency relationship can be created between a broker and buyer even if
they do not consciously intend to create one.1
8
In some states, even if statutory law defines agency relationships,
KAN. B.A., May 1999, at 36, 37.
Typical buyers spend hours with the selling agent, look at seven to 12
properties listed by several different companies, rely on the selling agent to
show them the "best deals," and never meet the listing agent .... Most real
estate brokers, on the other hand, had long been taught that they worked for
the seller because the seller paid their fee.
Id.
14. Id.
15. Brown & Grohman, supra note 3, at 54.
Prospective buyers could not understand that the brokers who had helped to
find a property, search for neighborhoods, prequalify them for a mortgage,
reduce their offers to writing, and perform the other seemingly endless tasks
involved in helping them buy real estate were anything but their agents. They
could not fathom that "their" brokers were actually working for the other side,
i.e., the sellers, because it was counterintuitive.
Id.
16. See, e.g., Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205 (Ct. App. 1963); see also
Dismuke v. Edina Realty, Inc., No. 92-8716, 1993 WL 327771, at *3 (D. Minn. June
17, 1993); Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 390 (Ct. App. 1984); George v.
Williams, 580 P.2d 1357 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978). For a discussion of the magnitude of
the problems, see, e.g., Valerie M. Sieverling, Professional Responsibility: The
Changing Face of the Real Estate Professional: Keeping Pace, 63 Mo. L. REv. 581,
592 (1998).
17. Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
[T]he duty of a real estate broker, representing the seller, to disclose facts...
includes the affirmative duty to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent
inspection of the residential property listed for sale and to disclose to
prospective purchasers all facts materially affecting the value or desirability
of the property that such an investigation would reveal.
Id. (footnote omitted).
18. Larner-Diener Realty Co. v. Fredman, 266 S.W.2d 689, 690 (Mo. 1954)
(quoting 2 C.J.S. Agency § 17, at 1041-42 (1914)) ("The creation of the relation of
principal and agent rests in the intention of the parties which may be express or implied,
and need not be a conscious intention, but may be determined from the facts and
circumstances of the particular case."); see also Mueller v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 466
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
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the courts used common law to circumvent the statutes and hold
brokers to a more stringent standard.19 The most influential of these
cases was Dismuke v. Edina Realty, Inc.,20 in which the fourth largest
real estate firm in the United States was sued for breaching its fiduciary
duty to a seller. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the firm failed to
adequately disclose the facts of its dual agency relationship with both
plaintiff buyer and seller.2' Even though the real estate firm met all the
statutory requirements for adequate disclosure, the court held that it did
22not meet common law requirements. The court explained that "the
firm's failure to furnish plaintiffs with a full and adequate disclosure of
facts concerning its dual agency is a breach of its fiduciary duty to
plaintiffs. 23
In response to the confusion over agency relationships and what
brokers must disclose, the National Association of Realtors ("NAR")
began examining the issues through its Agency Task Force and other
advisory groups. 24 NAR concluded that clarified legislation was the
best solution to the problem and recommended nine amendments for
state legislatures to implement.2  NAR's recommendations included
defining clearly the available brokerage relationships, clarifying and
providing guidance on disclosed dual agency relationships,
promulgating disclosure forms, and addressing brokers' disclosure
duties as to the condition of the property.26 Also, NAR advised the
19. See Dismuke, 1993 WL 327771, at *3.
20. Id.
21. Id. at*1.
The parties agree that plaintiffs in each instance initialed the disclosure
statement and were aware that Edina Realty sales associates represented the
sellers as well as the buyers. The parties also agree that Edina Realty relied
solely on the disclosure statement to disclose and explain its dual agency
status in these transactions.... Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that Edina
Realty breached its fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty to plaintiffs in the
subject transactions by 'fail[ing] to fully and adequately disclose the
consequences and effect of its dual agency status' to plaintiffs.
Id.
22. Id. at *3 ("While this disclosure statement appears to satisfy Edina Realty's
statutory disclosure obligation to plaintiffs under Minn.Stat. Sec. 82.19 Subd. 5, it
cannot be characterized as either a full or adequate disclosure of all the facts under
common law.").
23. Id.
24. NAT'L Ass'N OF REALTORS, supra note 5.
25. Id. NAR "concluded that clarifying legislation would address many of the
problems encountered by consumers and real estate professionals in this area. Many
state associations have been and currently are working on comprehensive agency
relationship legislation." Id.
26. Id. The nine specific recommendations of NAR are as follows:
(1) The legislation should include well-defined duties for each type of
brokerage relationship.
(2) The legislation should clarify the common law of agency as applied to real
2002]
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states to clarify in the statutory law that the legislation displaces the
common law as it applies to broker agency relationships.27 This is
essential to avoid situations such as the one found in Dismuke, in which
the broker follows the statutory law, but is still found liable for failing
to follow the common law of agency.28 Many states, including
Pennsylvania, have followed some or all of the recommendations of
NAR in amending real estate law.
29
B. Real Estate Law in Pennsylvania
1. Traditional Pennsylvania Practice
Before Act 112, Pennsylvania followed the typical pattern under
which real estate brokers were generally considered to be agents of the
estate brokerage relationships by creating a statutory agency relationship and
by creating a presumption that the relationship is one of statutory agency
unless the licensee and the client enter into an agreement specifically
providing for a different type of representation.
(3) The legislation should contain clear guidance on disclosed dual agency
[because] disclosed dual agency with informed consent is legal in every state,
with the possible exception of Arkansas. However, this is not widely known,
so it is important that legislation specifically acknowledge this.
(4) The legislation should provide for the ability on the part of a broker in an
in-company transaction to designate an individual licensee within the broker's
company to represent the seller, and to designate another individual licensee
within the company to represent a buyer, without creating a dual agency
relationship.
(5) The legislation should eliminate or modify the consumer's vicarious
liability for the acts of the licensee.
(6) The legislature (or the state's real estate commission) should promulgate
agency disclosure forms and rules for meaningful, timely and mandatory
written disclosure.
(7) The legislation should specify how brokerage relationships end and
describe the licensee's duties upon the termination of a client relationship.
(8) The legislation should address the licensee's disclosure duties with respect
to property condition and address broker liability issues.
(9) The legislation specifically should state that it abrogates the common law
as applied to real estate brokerage relationships.
Id.
27. Id.
28. Dismuke, 1993 WL 327771; NAT'L Ass'N OF REALTORS, supra note 5.
It is very important that agency legislation abrogate the common law. If
legislation does not abrogate the common law it loses the very important
aspect of certainty. A broker then could be in the position of having followed
the letter of the law only to find that a court looked instead to the state's
common law.
Id.
29. NAT'L Ass'N OF REALTORS, supra note 5.
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seller. 30 The broker had a traditional agent-principal relationship with
the seller in which the broker owed the seller a fiduciary duty; it was
the broker's job to get the best price for the seller.31 The statutory law
was silent as to new agency relationships and written agency disclosure
to buyers.32 Brokers in the Commonwealth used regional Multiple
Listing Services to market their listings to other brokers.33 The selling
broker who found the buyer was a subagent (also called a cooperating
agent) and was considered to be an extension of the listing agent,
working for the seller.34 Legally, the subagent was a representative of
the seller; however, in practice, the role of the subagent evolved to
include duties to the buyer, such as helping to obtain a mortgage.
35
Because subagents were performing activities to assist them, many
buyers assumed that this agent was their representative, at least in
part.36 While legally the brokers were representing sellers, common
practice evolved that brokers worked for both parties.
2. Pennsylvania's Common Law
While the statutory law remained silent, the courts expanded the
roles of real estate brokers in Pennsylvania by deciding that a broker
could represent more than one party in a transaction. 37 Traditionally,
agency law does not permit one agent to serve more than one party
because "no man can serve two masters., 38  However, the law of
agency permits two exceptions to this general rule: when no conflict
exists or when there is full disclosure to the parties. 39  The first
exception is clearly not applicable to real estate brokers, as there is a
30. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.606 (West 1997) (amended 1998); see also
Agency Hearing of February 15, 1993: Before the Pennsylvania Real Estate
Commission [hereinafter Agency Hearing] (statement of Jim Helsel, Jr., President,
Pennsylvania Association of Realtors).
31. Agency Hearing, supra note 30.
32. tit. 63, § 455.606 (amended 1998).
33. Collins v. Main Line Bd. of Realtors, 304 A.2d 493, 494 (Pa. 1973).
34. Grant v. Purdy, 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 42, 45 (Delaware 1974).
35. Telephone Interview with James Goldsmith, Legal Counsel, Pennsylvania
Association of Realtors (Jan. 18, 2002). James Goldsmith was the drafter of Act 112.
Id.
36. Id.
37. See Wash. Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 565 F. Supp. 1100 (W.D. Pa. 1979);
Onorato v. Wissahickon Park, Inc., 244 A.2d 22 (Pa. 1968).
38. Onorato, 244 A.2d at 25 (citing Everhart v. Searle, 71 Pa. 256 (1872);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 389 (1958); Matthew 6:24).
39. Id. ("Two time-honored exceptions exist to the maxim that an agent cannot
represent two principals... where there is no conflict between the duties owed to the




direct conflict between the interests of the buyer and seller.40  The
conflict arises in every real estate transaction because "it is the duty of
the agent for the vendor to sell the property at the highest price" but "it
is the duty of an agent for a purchaser to buy it at the lowest price.
''4
The second exception, when full disclosure occurs, can be applied
in the context of a real estate transaction. In Onorato v. Wissahickon
Park,42 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a real estate agent
could represent two adverse parties as long as there was "clear and
satisfactory proof' of an agreement to waive the general rule for having
separate agents.43 The clear and satisfactory proof must include an
actual, express agreement. 44 There can be no question as to whether the
principal has knowledge of the dual relationship and agrees to it; assent
cannot be made by silence and knowledge cannot be inferred even in
circumstances in which the principal had reason to know of it.
45
Federal courts have also read Pennsylvania common law to allow
dual agency representation.46 In Washington Steel Corp. v. T. W
Corp.,47 the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, applying Pennsylvania law, held that, when an adverse
dual agency relationship exists, the agent must inform the parties and
have their agreement to proceed.48 The defendant in Washington Steel
breached its duty to the parties because it concealed the fact that it was
"operating in an adverse agency relationship and a dual agency
relationship with an adverse party.",49 The agent, in this case a bank,
had a duty to disclose all information relevant to enable the parties to
make an informed decision about whether or not they would allow a
40. Id. ("The real estate transaction... represents the typical situation in which the
duties owed to the respective principals conflict violently.").
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 26 (explaining that the agreement to allow dual agency "cannot be
inferred either from knowledge of the fact.., or from mere silence or failure to
dissent"); Mitchell v. Schreiner, 43 Pa. Super. 633 (1910) ("There should be no
question about the principal's knowledge, and where this is clearly shown, and
notwithstanding that knowledge, the parties without protest, continued their
negotiations, again agreeing to pay commission, the contract will be sustained."),
quoted with approval in Onorato, 244 A.2d at 26.
44. Onorato, 244 A.2d at 26.
45. Id.
46. See generally Wash. Steel. Corp. v. TW Corp., 565 F. Supp. 1100 (W.D. Pa.
1979).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1105. Defendant breached his duty because "Defendant Chemical Bank
did not advise the Plaintiff Washington Steel of its adverse and dual agency relationship
with Defendant Talley and TW." Id.
49. Id.
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dual agency relationship. 50 Failure to make this disclosure was a breach
by the agent.5 Changes in Pennsylvania real estate practice and in
Pennsylvania common law led to statutory amendments concerning
agency and disclosure.
III. Analysis of the Real Estate Licensing Act of 1998
A. Legislative History
1. Amendments of 1990
In 1990, the Pennsylvania legislature first responded to the
national trend toward representation and disclosure for buyers with
amendments to Pennsylvania's Real Estate Licensing Act.52 Under the
1990 amendments, brokers had to disclose to buyers that "the broker is
the agent of the seller or that the broker is the agent of the buyer.,
53
This statement had to be disclosed at the initial interview with a
consumer, and the Pennsylvania Real Estate Commission had authority
to promulgate regulations concerning such disclosures. 54  The
legislature introduced the concept of buyer representation into statutory
law with these provisions, 55 a move that reflected the changing
relationship of the subagent to a buyer's broker.5 6 However, the law
provided few details on the nature of a buyer-broker relationship and
how such a relationship would be created.57
2. Early Considerations for Reform
50. Id.
Chemical Bank was well aware of its fiduciary obligation to Plaintiff
Washington Steel and Defendants Tally and TW, and as a matter of law the
Defendant Chemical Bank had a duty not to act adversely to the interests of
Plaintiff Washington Steel under the circumstances; and further, the
Defendant Chemical Bank had a duty to disclose all relevant facts which
Chemical Bank knew or should have known that were relevant to allowing
Plaintiff Washington Steel to make an informed decision as to whether or not
Plaintiff Washington Steel should allow a dual agency relationship with
adverse parties to continue.
Id.
51. Id.
52. Act of June 29, 1990, P.L. 246, 1990 Pa. Laws 58 (codified as amended at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § § 455.101-.701 (West 2002)).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.608(1) (West 1997) (amended 1998).
54. Id. (amended 1998).
55. Id. § 455.607 (amended 1998).
56. Telephone Interview with James Goldsmith, supra note 35.
57. tit. 63, § 455.607 (amended 1998).
2002]
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During the 1990's, the Pennsylvania Real Estate Commission
(hereinafter "Commission") wanted to combat consumer confusion with
a written disclosure form. 58 The Pennsylvania Association of Realtors
("PAR") lobbied for the Commission to delay issuing a form until the
law was further amended. 59 The brokers in PAR were concerned that
the Commission's form was "very complicated and difficult for an
agent to use," and stated that "legislation would be the best avenue to
refine agency law.",60 PAR agreed with the notion that clients must be
informed but wanted a disclosure less complex and rigid than the
standardized form of the Commission.6' PAR wanted new legislation
because of the lingering conflict with the role of subagents, consumer
dissatisfaction, and litigation occurring in other states.62  Many
transactions continued to involve a listing broker who represented a
seller, and a subagent who legally represented the seller but appeared to
represent the buyer.63  There was confusion among brokers and
consumers over the true role of the subagent; consumers wanted a true
advocate while brokers wanted clarification before litigation occurred.64
The Pennsylvania General Assembly began to address the
concerns of the brokers and consumers in House Bill 1172. Early drafts
attempted to correct the problem of inadequate disclosure to the parties
by following the recommendations of the Commission.65  These
disclosure proposals required brokers to disclose all duties that they
66have performed to all parties. For example, instead of disclosing only
whom the broker represents, the broker must disclose "any possibility
that the broker, or any licensee affiliated with the broker, may provide
58. See Agency Hearing, supra note 30 (noting the comments presented to the
commission by the public). "The purpose of the hearing was to gather input from the




62. Telephone Interview with James Goldsmith, supra note 35.
63. Id
64. Id.
65. See generally H.B. 1172, 182d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1998) (proposing
amendments to Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§
455.101-.701 (West 1997) (amended 1998)).
66. Id. § 606 (2)(3), 607(1). The broker must disclose to the seller
a statement describing the nature and extent of the broker's duty to the
seller/landlord or buyer/tenant ... [and] a statement identifying any
possibility that the broker, or any licensee affiliated with the broker, may
provide services to more than one consumer in a single transaction, and if so,
an explanation of the duties that may be owed the other party and whether the
broker may accept a fee for those services.
Id. In addition, the broker must disclose to the buyer "the capacity in which the broker
is engaged in the transaction and whether the broker, or any licensee affiliated with the
broker, has provided services to any other party in the transaction." Id.
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services to more than one consumer in a single transaction, and if so, an
explanation of the duties that may be owed the other party." 67 This
early version of the bill described the common law agency and required
its disclosure, but did not codify dual agency.68
3. The Purpose of Act 112
Final revisions of Act 112 went much further to codify the dual
agency principles established in the common law. 69  The legislature
defined the boundaries of dual agency and set guidelines for real estate
brokers to follow when in a dual agency relationship. 70 By defining
dual agency, there would be a consistent format for consumer
protection. 7' If a violation occurs, the Commission can prosecute the
broker for failure to meet the statutory requirements, rather than a
failure only to follow an abstract principle of insufficient disclosure.72
Furthermore, Act 112 redefined the traditional seller's agency and the
related buyer's agency, codified dual agency, and enacted new types of
agency, such as transactional.73
In addition to targeting problems with agency relationships, Act
112 addressed consumer confusion with disclosure.74 The sponsor of
Act 112, Representative Mario Civera, stated: "[C]onsumer confusion
currently exists as many buyers believe the realtor they are working
with is their agent when, in fact, they are the sellers' sub-agent., 75 The
law was enacted to provide more information to all consumers as to
67. Id. § 608(3).
68. Id. § 608. At the initial interview with a consumer, the broker must disclose
"the nature of the real estate services the broker provides," that the consumer has "the
option for an agency relationship with the broker," and that the broker may provide
services to another party in the transaction." Id.
69. 1998 PA. HOUSE LEGIS. JOURNAL 1467 (1999) (statement of Rep. Civera,
sponsor of H.B. 1172) ("[T]he legislation will define the relationships between
consumers and realtors. [It] will also statutorily recognize the concept of dual
agency ... a common practice in Pennsylvania for many years.").
70. Id. ("The Professional Licensure Committee approved [the bill] because it
appears to be the best option for protecting consumers by providing guidelines for
disclosure and consent needed under common law.").
71. Id.
72. Id. Rep. Civera explained that without guidelines established by statutory law,
"it is doubtful that the Real Estate Commission could prosecute a licensee for failing to
provide adequate disclosures." Id.
73. See generally Act of June 29, 1990, P.L. 246, 1990 Pa. Laws 58 (codified as
amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 455.101-.701 (West 2002)). The Act also
codified designated agency, a combination of seller, buyer, and dual agency, that will
not be discussed in this comment. Id.
74. 1998 PA. HOUSE LEGIS. JOURNAL 1467 (1999). Rep. Civera pointed to




whom the broker represents.76 The law attempts to achieve this goal
with required written disclosure to a consumer at the initial meeting
with the broker.
77
4. Comments of the National Association of Realtors
The Pennsylvania law takes into consideration the
recommendations of NAR.78 Act 112 incorporates the first and third
recommendations of NAR79 by defining duties for each type of agency
relationship and providing guidance on dual agency. 80 However, Act
112 fails to adopt other NAR recommendations, including provisions
that (1) establish a "baseline" relationship, (2) define steps for
termination of a relationship, and (3) state whether the statute displaces
common law.
8 1
First, the Act fails to establish a baseline relationship, which would
have ensured that no relationship is ever presumed between consumer
and broker.82 The drafters of the legislation wanted brokers "to give
consumers a menu" of agency choices and then to make a conscious
effort to establish the chosen relationship.83  Second, termination
provisions are mentioned throughout the Act, although no section is
dedicated to it.84  For example, a broker cannot reveal confidential
information even after the termination of an agency relationship. 85
Because the provisions embedded within the statute adequately provide
for the process, a separate section dedicated to termination is
unnecessary. Finally, Act 112 did not explicitly displace the common
76. Id. ("The information real estate licenses will have to provide to consumers
before acting as their representative will be defined ... [this] will create a better
understanding of the relationships between consumers and realtors.").
77. See generally Act of June 29, 1990. The concept of a standardized form given
at the initial meeting is what the Commission wanted when it attempted to promulgate a
form prior to the enactment of Act 112. Agency Hearing, supra note 30.
78. NAT'L Ass'N OF REALTORS, supra note 5.
79. See supra note 26.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
81. See supra note 26. A "baseline" relationship would be the presumed
relationship if no agreed upon relationship was formed by the broker and the consumer.
It would act as the default relationship. Not only does Act 112 not discuss termination,
it also does not describe "what duties the licensee continues to owe after the termination
of the relationship." Stating whether or not the statute abrogates common law is very
important because "a broker then could be in the position of having followed the letter
of the law only to find that a court looked instead to the state's common law." See
supra note 26.
82. Telephone Interview with James Goldsmith, supra note 35.
83. Id.
84. See generally Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, §§ 455.101-.701 (West 2002).
85. Id. § 455.604.
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law because the drafters presumed it would do so since it was drafted in
response to the common law.86 Any statement to abrogate common law
would be superfluous.87
Act 112 was signed into law in November 1998 by Governor Tom
Ridge. 88 Despite signing it, Governor Ridge had some concerns about
the law, particularly the provisions on dual agency. 9 In a letter to the
state legislature, Ridge stated dual agency "has the potential to impair
consumers' rights" and "is an inherent conflict of interest."90 Although
NAR and PAR dismissed such concerns as irrelevant since dual agency
reflects common real estate practice, legal commentators have raised
the same concerns as Governor Ridge.
91
B. Act 112 's Agency Relationships
Act 112 establishes several types of agency relationships,
including seller, buyer, dual, and transactional licensees, each with
distinct duties for the broker to the consumers.92 Although there are
some benefits to each type of relationship, each comes with potential
consequences for the consumers and brokers.
1. Seller's Agent
The first type of agency relationship defined by Act 112 is the
traditional seller's agent, in which the broker represents the seller alone
and owes only the seller a fiduciary duty.93 The agent must be loyal to
the principal, and must make a good faith effort to find a buyer for the
principal's property.94 The agent can advise the seller and make
suggestions such as listing price for the property. 95 The agent can use
86. Telephone Interview with James Goldsmith, supra note 35.
87. Id.
88. Telephone Interview with David Reddecliff, Pa. House G.O.P. Research Staff
(Oct. 21, 2001).
89. Gov Signs Agency Law, with Warning, AGENCY L. Q./REAL EST. INTELLIGENCE
REP., Winter 1999, at 1.
90. Id.
91. Id.; see, e.g., Brown & Grohman, supra note 3; J. Clark Pendergrass, The Real
Estate Consumer's Agency and Disclosure Act: The Case Against Dual Agency, 48
ALA. L. REv. 277 (1996).
92. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.606 (West 2002).
93. Id. § 455.606(b).
Duties of the broker acting as an agent for the seller include the following: (1)
to be loyal to the seller by taking action that is consistent with the seller's
interest in a transaction; and (2) to make a continuous and good faith effort to
find a buyer for the property ....
Id.
94. Id.
95. Videotape: Pennsylvania Agency: Changes and Choices (Pennsylvania
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personal expertise and knowledge to help the seller with negotiating
strategies and to obtain contract terms favorable to the seller.
96
This type of relationship is beneficial because it is clear to the
agent to whom the fiduciary duty is owed. 97 However, a buyer may not
realize the nature of the agency relationship or the full extent of the
duty that the agent owes the seller alone. Although it may seem to the
buyer that, in trying to facilitate the deal, the agent is helping the buyer
as well as the seller, this is not the case. 98 The agent owes no duty to
the buyer.99 However, this situation could be addressed through a
simple disclosure, such as: "I represent the seller only. Any
information you convey to me, I must share with the seller."
2. Buyer's Agent
The second type of relationship is a buyer's broker, which mirrors
the seller's agent relationship except that, in buyer's agency, the agent
has a duty to the buyer. 00 The agent must be loyal to the buyer,
represent the buyer's interests, and make a good faith effort to find the
buyer a property. 101 In a real estate transaction, while sellers maintain
an agency relationship with one broker, buyers can also have their own
agent.10 2 Under this arrangement, there is a separate agent looking out
for the interests of each party. 0 3 When a broker represents a buyer, the
broker can use personal knowledge and expertise to advise the buyer on
price, point out good and bad features of a property, make
recommendations for inspections, and protect the buyer with favorable
terms in the contract.
0 4
However, the extent of the duty that the broker owes to the buyer
Association of Realtors 1999) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Agency] (on file with the
Pennsylvania Association of Realtors).
96. See generally PA. ASS'N OF REALTORS, Do's AND DON'TS FOR SELLER'S
AGENTS (1999).
97. tit. 63, § 455.606(b).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. § 455.606(c).
Duties of the broker acting as an agent for the buyer include the following: (1)
to be loyal to the buyer by taking action that is consistent with the buyer's
interest in a transaction; and (2) to make a continuous and good faith effort to
find a property for the buyer ... (3) to disclose to the listing broker, at first
contact, that the broker has been engaged as a buyer's agent. In the absence





104. See generally PA. ASS'N OF REALTORS, supra note 96.
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is questionable because, traditionally, the seller is still compensating the
buyer's agent.'0 5 This presents a potential conflict for the buyer's
agent, who should be looking out for the client's best interests but is
being compensated by a conflicting interest. Although the buyer wants
the lowest price possible, it is in the broker's best personal interest to
get a higher price for a higher commission. This conflict could be
prevented by the buyer contracting to compensate the agent personally
instead of the agent being compensated by the listing broker.
3. Dual Agent
Act 112 establishes guidelines for a new dual agency
relationship. 10 6  This relationship is modeled after the dual agency
relationship recognized in common law in which an agent "may act as a
dual agent only with the written consent of both parties to the
transaction following disclosures. ''1°7 In dual agency, the agent must
(1) take no action against either party's interest, (2) make a good faith
effort to find a purchaser for the seller's property, and (3) make a good
faith effort to find the buyer a property.1
0 8
Dual agency offers some benefits for all of the parties. Without
dual agency, a buyer with a buyer's agent would be precluded from
looking at a property listed by that agent. 109 Further, the parties are
both getting representation from a party that understands all sides of the
transaction. This type of agency reflects the changes in the practice of
real estate from a situation in which brokers were helping both parties,
even though they technically only represented the seller, to one in
which brokers can represent and help both parties without having to
choose sides or send one party to another agent.
However, there is an inherent conflict of interest in dual agency."1
0
The parties are diametrically opposed, with one trying to get the highest
105. Pennsylvania Agency, supra note 95.
106. tit. 63, § 455.606(d)(1) ("A licensee may act as a dual agency only with the
written consent of both parties to the transaction following the disclosure given at the
initial interview.").
107. Id.
108. Id. § 455.606(d)(2).
The duties of a dual agent include the following: (1) to take no action that is
adverse or detrimental to either party's interest in a transaction; (2) unless
otherwise agreed to in writing, to make a continuous and good faith effort to
find a buyer for the property... (3) unless otherwise agreed to in writing, to
make a continuous and good faith effort to find a property for the buyer ....
Id.
109. See 1998 PA. HOUSE LEGIS. JOURNAL 1467 (1999).




price possible and the other the lowest, and one agent in the middle
representing both parties. The agent owes both parties "the same
degree of care and loyalty as if [the agent] represented each alone"-
including information that might affect the sale."' It would be
impossible to make this full disclosure if information confidential to the
other party was information that might affect the sale. As one
commentator noted: "You're either loyal or your not. It's like being
slightly pregnant."
' 12
Another problem with dual agency is that the parties are
underrepresented. Each party is getting more limited representation
because the agent cannot possibly work fully for the benefit of one
party without jeopardizing the interests of the other party. Certain
information, such as the buyer's willingness to pay top dollar or the
seller's willingness to take less, could be disclosed if only one party
was represented, but it would be confidential in a dual agency
relationship. In dual agency, consumers are agreeing to nonexclusive
representation and divided loyalty, when other relationships allow for
exclusive representation and absolute loyalty."13
4. Transactional Agent
Another type of agency relationship defined by Act 112 is
transactional licensee, in which an agent represents none of the parties,
and the agent's role is merely to facilitate the transaction." 4 Agents
must make it clear to both parties that they represent neither of them
and that they can offer them only limited confidentiality. 1 5 The agent
may not disclose to the seller that a buyer is willing to pay more than
the offered price, or to the buyer that the seller is willing to take less
than the listing price, or discuss terms of financing with either party."
6
111. Vickie J. Brady, Comment, The "Brokerage Relations" Additions to the
Illinois Real Estate License Act: The Case of the Legalized Conflict of Interest, 22 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 725, 736 (1998).
112. Pendergrass, supra note 91, at 291 (quoting Karen Blumenthal, Could Your
Broker Be a Double Agent?, WALL STREET J., Sept. 8, 1995, at B8)).
113. Id. at295.
114. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.606(f)(1) (West 2002). ("The duties of a
transactional licensee include the following: (1) to advise the consumer to be assisted
that the licensee is not acting as an agent or advocate of the consumer and should not be
provided with confidential information.").
115. Id.
116. Id. § 455.606(f)(2). It is the licensee's duty "to provide limited confidentiality.
A licensee shall not disclose information that the seller will accept a price less than the
asking price or listed price, that the buyer will pay a price greater than the price
submitted in a written offer or that a seller or buyer will agree to financing terms othei
than those offered." Id.
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The broker cannot give any advice to either party, including suggestions
on price and recommendations on contract terms or negotiations.'
1 7
The broker must remain neutral at all times, and simply walk the parties
through the steps of the transaction.' 
8
Transactional agency can be beneficial because it is neutral to
everyone. Some commentators have regarded this situation as the one
that most closely resembles the traditional broker's role as a facilitator
and a neutral party, working to bring parties together instead of working
for one party alone." 9 Also, such an arrangement avoids the conflict-
of-interest problem that arises with dual agency.
120
The problem with transactional licensees is that no parties are
represented when generally they would each prefer to have at least
minimal representation. The parties, especially the seller who is
compensating the broker, are getting less representation than they want
and that they could have under another agency relationship.' 21 In a
survey of real estate consumers, seventy-six percent of sellers wanted to
be represented exclusively, while sixty percent of buyers wanted the
broker to have a fiduciary duty to them.122 With transactional licensees,
the consumers cannot take advantage of the knowledge and expertise of
the broker who they have hired.
Another difficulty involving transactional licensees is determining
the appropriate level of confidentiality. The law describes the
confidentiality only in price negotiations' 23 and is not specific as to
other duties owed to the parties with a transactional agent, such as in
negotiating contract terms other than price.
Transactional licensees also run the risk of liability if they perform
more or less duties than the law requires. If transactional brokers go
beyond the acts that they may perform under law, then run the risk of
117. See generally PA. ASS'N OF REALTORS, supra note 96.
118. Id.
119. Jarboe, supra note 13, at 42-43.
The Kansas law defines transactional broker as: a broker who assists one or
more parties with a real estate transaction without being an agent or advocate
for the interests of any party to such transaction... The best one-word
definition of transaction brokerage is, "facilitator." Transaction brokerage
created by BRRETA II permits the real estate broker to act as a neutral party,
which is exactly what most brokers thought they were, and what many
members of the public want.
Id.
120. See generally Jarboe, supra note 13.
121. Brown & Grohman, supra note 3, at 55.
122. Id. (explaining that "the concept of transactional brokers is inconsistent with
buyers' and sellers' expectations").
123. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.606(f)(2) (West 2002).
2002]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
establishing a common law agency relationship with the consumer. 1 4
This relationship would be formed without the written disclosure and
agreement necessary to establish an agency relationship.
C. Types of Disclosure
Generally there are two types of disclosures that agents must make
to all consumers. First, they must disclose material facts about the
transaction, depending on the level of confidentiality with the
principals, as well as facts about the agency relationship of the
parties. 125 Second, no matter what the nature of the agency relationship,
an agent must disclose "known material defects about the property" to
consumers. 1
26
1. Agency Relationship Disclosure
To lessen consumer confusion about whom the broker represents,
section 608 of Act 112 describes all the information that a broker must
present to a consumer. 127 These disclosures include explaining each
type of agency relationship provided for by Act 112 and giving the
consumer the option to enter into an agency agreement with a broker.
128
After the adoption of Act 112, the Commission promulgated a written
124. Sieverling, supra note 16, at 592.
125. See tit. 63, § 455.606 (describing the duties for each particular relationship); Id.
§ 455.608 (describing when to make the disclosure).
126. Id. § 455.606(a)(1)(d). Despite the scope of the agency relationship, the broker
must "comply with those obligations imposed upon a licensee by the act of July 2, 1996
(P.L. 500, No. 84), known as the 'Real Estate Seller Disclosure Act."' Id. (footnote
omitted). The Real Estate Disclosure Act requires brokers to make disclosures about
material defects. Real Estate Seller Disclosure Law, 68 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7301-04
(2002) (original version at 68 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1021-36 (1998)).
127. tit. 63, § 455.608. The disclosures that must be made at the initial interview
shall include:
(1) A disclosure of the relationships in which the broker may engage with the
consumer. The disclosure shall describe the duties that the broker owes in
each relationship provided for in this act.
(2) A statement informing sellers and buyers of their option to have an agency
relationship with the broker, that an agency relationship is not to be presumed
and that it will exist only as set forth in a written agreement between the
broker and consumer of real estate service acknowledged by the consumer.
(3) A statement that a real estate consumer has the right to enter into a
negotiated agreement with the broker limiting the activities of practices that
the broker will provide on behalf of the consumer...
(4) a statement identifying any possibility that the broker may provide
services to another consumer who may be a party to the transaction and, if so,
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notice to consumers regarding this information, which agents must
distribute at the initial interview with a consumer.1 29  This written
notice requirement was distinctly different from the previous one, under
which the broker had only to disclose orally to the consumer the nature
of the representation.13
The Commission's notice does not reflect how the brokers wanted
to disclose agency to consumers. Although PAR wanted clients to be
informed, it objected to the Commission's standardized form because
"there are practical impediments to satisfying a requirement that
broker's provide a detailed agency disclosure at the initial interview." '13 1
There are two main problems with the disclosure form: timing and
complexity.
The timing of the disclosure, at the initial interview, poses
difficulties for brokers because "the initial interview is not a
standardized event which lends itself to the use of a standardized
form."'132 Often an abbreviated disclosure may be more appropriate
initially, followed by a more complete discussion of agency when the
consumer is ready to commit to working with the broker.' 33 Under the
Commission's regulations, a full disclosure had to take place at the
initial interview, which is "the first contact between a licensee and a
consumer of real estate-related services where a substantive discussion
about real estate needs occurs.'
' 34
This leads to questions by agents as to what qualifies as a
"substantive discussion" in a conversation. 35 For example, it is clear
that when a seller meets with the broker to list a property, this meeting
is the first interview with substantive discussion. However, there is less
clarity when considering a phone conversation between the listing
broker and a potential buyer in response to an advertisement. The
question then becomes the level of information that the broker can give
to the consumer before the conversation turns "substantive" and the
consumer must review forms on disclosure.' 36  Because of the
129. Id.; see also 49 PA. CODE § 35.336 (2002). Pennsylvania Law requires real
estate brokers and salespersons (licensees) to advise consumers of the business
relationships permitted by the Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act (Act 112).
This notice must be provided to the consumer "at the first contact where substantive
discussion about real estate occurs." Id.
130. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.608 (West 1997) (amended 1998).
131. Agency Hearing, supra note 30.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.608 (West 2002).
135. Id. § 455.606; see also 49 PA. CODE § 35.336 (2002). The Act and the
regulations do not define this term.
136. Agency Hearing, supra note 30.
The initial interview may be the call of a first time buyer interested in
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difficulties for brokers in giving the consumer notice at the first
substantive discussion, Act 47 of 2000 amended Act 112 to allow an
oral disclosure of agency relationships as long as it is followed by
written disclosure at the first meeting with the consumer.137  The
Commission promulgated a statement for this disclosure that basically
explains that there is no confidentiality until the notice is given and an
agency relationship is established. 38  At the first meeting with the
consumer, the agent must then present the full disclosure of agency
relationships and how they differ, and not the abbreviated disclosure
recommended by PAR. 1
39
A second problem pointed out by PAR with the agency disclosure
form is its complexity. Instead of a standard form explaining in detail
every type of potential agency relationship, PAR wanted to give
disclosure in the form of a simple admonishment, 40 such as advising
the potential client to "refrain from disclosing financial or detailed
personal information or from entering substantive negotiation without
first establishing the nature of the relationship between the party and the
broker." 4 The admonishment would make consumers aware of their
rights without having to explain detailed information about agency law.
This is essentially what the oral disclosure allows. A consumer can ask
a few questions of the broker or about a property and would not have to
commit to any type of relationship beforehand. The consumer can
simply obtain the relevant information and retain the opportunity to
enter into a relationship when and if the individual so desires.
The allowance of initial oral disclosure for phone conversations
does ease some of the timing and complexity problems of Act 112;
however, ultimately, the consumer notice must be given and all types of
agency explained, even ones that may not apply to a scenario or be
offered by an office. An initial disclosure, stating that information is
not confidential until a relationship is established, should not be an
obtaining the sale price, a contact by a savvy real estate investor seeking data
but not looking for advice, or a seller interested in determining what a listing
broker charges. Reading the mandated disclosure may or may not be
practicable.
Id.
137. Act of June 22, 2000, P.L. 371, 2000 Pa. Laws 47 (codified as amended at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 455.101-701 (West 2002)).
138. 49 PA. CODE § 35.284. The Commission adopted regulations concerning oral
disclosure in March 2002. The regulations provide that the written notice stipulate that
there may be an oral disclosure. Id. § 35.336. Second, the regulations provide brokers
with an oral disclosure that must be read verbatim in the situation in which the initial
interview is during a telephone conversation. Id. § 35.284.
139. Act of June 22, 2000.
140. Agency Hearing, supra note 30.
141. Id.
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exception limited to phone conversation, but should be the general rule,
applying to all initial conversations with consumers. Further, detail and
agency information are not necessary or relevant to consumers until
they are ready to enter into a relationship with a broker.
A third problem with the consumer notice is that it applies to both
residential and commercial transactions1 42 The law does not take into
consideration the sophistication of the consumer-it treats major
corporations the same as first-time homebuyers. 143 The purpose was to
clarify the law for those who did not understand agency relationships,
like first-time homebuyers. 44  There is no evidence that consumer
confusion was a problem for sophisticated commercial buyers.
In commercial transactions, issues could occur as to whether the
person actually viewing a property has the corporate authority to
acknowledge the disclosure or to enter into an agency relationship for
the corporation. In these situations, the admonishment form of
disclosure would be more appropriate, so a corporate consumer could
be aware of the situation without having to make any commitments
when there is no authority to do so. The Commission has attempted to
address this issue by advising brokers that giving the notice to a single
corporate representative is sufficient notice under the law. 145
After explaining the agency relationships and consumer options,
the consumer must acknowledge receipt of the agency disclosure by
signing the disclosure form.' 146 Some consumers could be hesitant to
sign the form because it appears to be too much like a contract, or they
did not fully understand all of its provisions. Other consumers, such as
corporate consumers, could choose not to sign the form since they may
lack the authority to do so. Such problems led to an amendment to Act
112 in 2000. Act 47 added a provision to the disclosure form so that
brokers could note a consumer's refusal to sign.147 After the disclosure,
the consumer has the option to enter into a contract with the broker for
representation. 148
142. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.608 (West 2002).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. PA. ASS'N OF REALTORS, NEW AGENCY REGULATIONS (2002), at
http://www.parealtor.org/uploaded/document/Consumer/ 20Notice%20update.doc (last
visited July 1, 2002).
146. 49 PA. CODE § 35.336 (2002) (stating that the disclosure form promulgated by
the Pennsylvania Real Estate Commission requires the consumer to sign the notice to
acknowledge receipt).
. 147. Act of June 22, 2000, P.L. 371, 2000 Pa. Laws 47 (codified as amended at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 455.101-.701 (West 2002)).
148. 49 PA. CODE § 35.336.
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2. Material Defect Disclosure
The second type of disclosure required of brokers is disclosure of
all material defects of the property. 149 Regardless of whether the broker
is representing the buyer as a buyer's agent, dual agent, or transactional
agent-or no agency exists-this disclosure is a duty of the broker. 1
50
IV. Comparison of Act 112 to Legislation of Other States
To understand better the nuances of Pennsylvania's agency law,
one should examine the legislation of other states. States such as
Nebraska and Missouri have adopted agency laws similar to
Pennsylvania, but with several variations. 15 1 Other states, like Florida
and Kansas, have adopted a statutory scheme similar to Pennsylvania,
but have since amended them due to concerns with the original agency
statute, primarily concerns with the conflicts with dual agency.'
52
A. Dealing with Dual Agency: Detailed Agency Provisions and
Adaptable Disclosure
Other states that allow dual agency attempt to correct consumer
confusion with more detailed agency provisions or more adaptable
disclosure procedures.
In Nebraska, consumers have the opportunity to engage a broker as
a seller's agent, buyer's agent or dual agent and are entitled to know
about the general duties, obligations, and responsibilities of the agency
relationship in real estate transactions.' 53  While Nebraska and
Pennsylvania both allow dual agency, the Nebraska statute spells out
specific actions in which the broker may engage and specific items that
the broker may not disclose to others. 54  For example, under the
Nebraska statute, a dual agent cannot disclose "that a buyer or tenant is
willing to pay more than the purchase price.' 55  In contrast,
149. Id. In the description of each agency relationship and the broker's duties, the
broker is required "to disclose known material defects about the property." Id.
150. Id. Although the disclosure of material defects is the source of much legal
conflict, this comment will not cover the topic in detail since it is a requirement of all
brokers regardless of type of agency relationship.
151. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 339.710-.840 (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-2401 to -
2430 (2002).
152. FLA. STAT. chs. 475.2701-.2801 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-30,103 (2002).
153. See generally NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-2401 to -2430.
154. Id. § 76-2419; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.606 (West 2002).
155. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2419(4)(a). Other issues that the dual agent cannot
disclose include information that the seller is willing to take less money, motivating
factors, financing terms, and facts that could psychologically stigmatize the consumer
about the property. Id.
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Pennsylvania's requirements are set forth only in the general provision
that the dual agent may "take no action that is adverse or detrimental to
either party's interest.' 56 The added detail of the Nebraska statute
eliminates some of the confusion by brokers regarding the meaning of
generalized legal terms such as good faith and loyalty in the context of
everyday business practice. Moreover, explaining duties in detail in the
statute limits the agency relationship to those specific duties to the
client, and, thus, reduces the chance for litigation for not adhering to
abstract duties. 157
Both laws have similar broker-disclosure provisions.'58 In both
states, brokers must inform consumers about different agency
relationships and disclose if the broker is working for another party at
the first substantial contact with the consumer. 59 Nebraska brokers
must give all consumers a pamphlet on agency relationships and
disclosure.' 60 This pamphlet is like the consumer notice of Act 112,
which defines each type of relationship. However, in Nebraska, brokers
create their own written disclosure explaining the relationships that the
broker offers and other individuals who the broker currently represents,
whereas, in Pennsylvania, brokers must use a standardized form. 6 1
Creating a personalized disclosure gives the broker the opportunity to
tailor the disclosure to the business practices of that particular office.
The law might be detailed, but the disclosure is tailored to fit the needs
of every broker and consumer.
Missouri's approach to real estate agency law is much like that of
Nebraska, with detailed sections for each type of available agency
relationship. 162  The disclosure of agency relationships in Missouri
takes place "at the earliest practicable opportunity."'' 63 This is more
business-friendly to brokers than Act 112's "initial interview" standard
because brokers under the Missouri law could have a chance to offer
some information about a property before needing to make the
disclosures. There can be more time to develop a rapport with
customers. Further, Missouri recently amended the law to make it clear
that this disclosure applies only to residential transactions. 164
Despite slight differences, the approach of Nebraska and Missouri
is very similar to the approach of Act 112 in Pennsylvania. All of these
156. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.606.4(b)(1).
157. Sieverling, supra note 16, at 584.
158. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2421; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.608.
159. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-242 1; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.608.
160. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2421(i)(a).
161. Id. § 76-2421(1)(b); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.608.
162. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 339.720-.755 (2002).




states allow for various types of agency, including dual agency. 165
However, Nebraska and Missouri use more detail to define the
responsibilities of these agents and provide for more adaptable forms of
disclosure. 166 Similar provisions in Pennsylvania could make Act 112
less confusing for brokers and consumers. Although more detailed or
adaptable disclosure attempts to address the confusion, these remedies
are not sufficient to correct the problem. Other states, like Colorado,
that had employed these methods ultimately found that confusion still
existed, and repealed dual agency altogether. 
167
B. Death to Dual: Simplifying Agency and Disclosure by Prohibiting
Dual Agency
The legislatures of both Florida and Kansas have enacted
legislation codifying dual agency in their states. 168  However, both
states have since repealed dual agency, and instead have implemented a
system of default transactional agency, where the broker by default
represents no party unless a written agreement is signed to the
contrary. 69 These states have tried to correct agency and disclosure
issues by making the law less complex.
Under Kansas law, a broker may be a seller's agent, buyer's agent,
or transactional broker. 170  Dual agency is not an option for brokers
since it was repealed in 2000 after the Kansas legislature expressed
concerns that it created inconsistent broker behavior and was confusing
for non-lawyers to understand.17' In Kansas, a broker is considered to
be a transactional agent unless the parties enter into an agreement for
another type of relationship.' 72 Under this scheme, a party does not
165. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 339.720-.755; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-2401 to -2430; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.606.
166. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 339.720-.840; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-2401 to -2430.
167. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-61-801 to -809 (2001) (amended 2002).
The statute was amended to read: "a broker shall not establish a dual agency." Dual
agency will be prohibited in Colorado as of Jan. 1, 2003. Id.
168. FLA. STAT. ch. 475.25 (1995) (amended 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-30,103
(1995) (amended 1996).
169. FLA. STAT. chs. 475.2701-.2801; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-30,103.
170. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-30,103.
Except when acting as a transaction broker or solely as a seller, buyer,
landlord or tenant, a broker shall act only as a statutory agent in any real
estate transaction. A licensee shall not act as an undisclosed dual agent or in
a dual capacity of agent and undisclosed principal in any transaction.
Id.
171. Brown & Grohman, supra note 3, at 56.
172. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-30,103. "A broker shall be considered a transactional
broker unless: (1) an agency relationship between the broker and the party to be
represented is established .... " Id.
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have to enter into a contract to get some limited services from the
broker. 73  This is different from Act 112, where a consumer is
completely unrepresented until entering into an agreement with a
broker. 74 Consumers who want real estate assistance but are not ready
to commit to a broker can benefit from a statutory scheme like the one
in Kansas. These consumers could work with a Kansas broker as a
transactional licensee until they are ready to commit to a broker and
enter into a contract for representation. In Pennsylvania, these
consumers would be completely unrepresented until they have
contracted with a broker.1
7 5
Disclosure of Kansas's agency relationships is made through a
brochure entitled "real estate brokerage relationships" and is given to
consumers "at the first practical opportunity."' 176 Unlike Act 112, this
provision gives brokers some freedom to speak with consumers and
establish a relationship with them before explaining agency. Second, a
licensee does not have to distribute the brochure in commercial
transactions. 177  This focuses the disclosure on parties that it was
designed to inform, while not interfering in commercial transactions.
Finally, in Kansas consumers do not have to sign the agency disclosure;
they would have to sign it only if they entered into an agreement with
the broker for representation.1 78 They do not have to acknowledge the
disclosure like in Pennsylvania.
179
Like Kansas, the Florida legislature has repealed dual agency
relationships for brokers. 80 Florida brokers are limited to acting as
transactional brokers or as brokers for only the seller or only the
buyer.' 8' In addition, Florida brokers can transition from representing
one party as a seller or buyer's broker to working only for the
transaction as a transactional licensee. 182 This would be very beneficial
for consumers in a case in which a broker has a signed contract and
could become a transactional broker to perform services for both parties
in preparation for closing. This transition tries to solve the same
problem dual agency tries to solve when a broker is representing one
173. Id.
174. 49 PA. CODE § 35.336 (2002).
175. Id.
176. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-30,110.
177. Id. §§ 58-30,110(3)(c).
178. Id. §§ 58-30,103, -30,110.
179. 49 PA. CODE § 35.336.
180. FLA. STAT. ch. 475.272 (2002) ("In order to eliminate confusion and provide
for a better understanding on the part of customers in real estate transactions, the
Legislature finds that.., disclosed dual agency as an authorized form of representation
by a real estate licensee in this state is expressly revoked.").
181. Brown & Grohman, supra note 3, at 55.
182. FLA. STAT. ch. 475.278(2)(b)(2).
2002]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
party, but later wants to assist the other party in some way. By
transitioning to transactional instead of dual agency, the broker avoids
the potential for a conflict of interest in the transaction. Instead of
adding another party to represent, the transition reduces the
representation.
Disclosure in Florida is a two-step process for residential
customers. First, all residential customers receive notice "to not assume
that any real estate broker or salesperson represents you" in order to
combat the misconception that they are represented. 183 This disclosure
is similar to what PAR wanted in Pennsylvania, because this
abbreviated disclosure was very simple to understand. 184 Second, a
notice must be given about the specific type of agency into which this
potential customer wants to enter. 85 For example, if the consumer
wants a broker to be a buyer's agent, the consumer would receive a
"Single Agent Notice" that details the duties that the broker owes as a
single agent.' 86 This is very different from Act 112, under which the
broker must explain every type of available relationship offered by the
state, even if they don't apply to the transaction at issue.' 87 Explaining
every relationship to every consumer makes it more difficult to
understand the current relationship.
Pennsylvania can avoid litigation for brokers and consumers by
following the lead of other states and amending Act 112. Simplifying
agency and disclosure like the statutes in Florida and Kansas would
make Pennsylvania's Act 112 easier for brokers to implement and for
consumers to understand.
V. Consequences and Possible Amendments to Act 112
The combination of numerous types of agency with required
written disclosure leads to complications that could be avoided by
amendments to Act 112.
A. Overall Consequences ofAct 112
One consequence of Act 112 is that it is too complicated for
brokers and consumers to understand and make informed choices. As
the law currently stands, to begin a relationship with a consumer, a
broker must first explain each type of agency and have the consumer
183. Id. § 475.278.
184. Agency Hearing, supra note 30.
185. FLA. STAT. ch. 475.278.
186. Id.
187. 49 PA. CODE § 35.336 (2002).
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sign a notice that the broker has done so.' 88 However, "if handing out
disclosure forms was an adequate way to teach the law, a law
professor's job would be easy; just give the students forms that disclose
the law" and have them sign off on it once they have read through it. 
89
Pennsylvania has non-lawyers explaining what basically amounts to the
legal ramifications of agency relationships to thousands of consumers
everyday. 190 After this disclosure, the law assumes that the average
consumer has a sufficient understanding of the law to make an informed
decision as to the type of agency relationship into which the consumer
wishes to enter with the broker. 191 The system has changed from the
buyer having virtually no choices and no disclosures regarding the
nature of the relationship to the buyer having so many choices and so
much disclosure that it is difficult to make an informed decision.
92
Because the law does not specifically define the duties of each
type of relationship, there is confusion for the brokers as well.' 93
Unlike Nebraska's statute, Act 112 gives only a generalized statement
for each relationship about loyalty and confidentiality, and does not
spell out the requirements like other states do.' 94 Legal terminology
like "good faith" and "confidentiality" may not be as clear to the
brokers as a listing of what they can and cannot do.
Another complication arises from the institution of all the agency
relationships in the aggregate because of the potential for mismatched
relationships. 95 For example, problems may arise if a seller, at the time
of listing, wants the broker to be the seller's agent alone, but later the
buyer wants that same broker to be a dual agent.' 96 This could be even
188. Id.
189. Brown & Grohman, supra note 3, at 56.
190. 49 PA. CODE § 35.336. Brokers explaining legal consequences of agency
relationships could be construed to be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
This was a concern of brokers when the form was instituted, see Agency Hearing, supra
note 30, and a concern of legal commentators, see, e.g., Brady, supra note 111.
191. 49 PA. CODE § 35.336.
192. Compare Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, P.L. 15, 1980 Pa. Laws 9
(current version at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 455.101-.701 (West 2002)), with Act of
Nov. 25, 1998, P.L. 908, 1998 Pa. Laws 112 (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, §§ 455.101-701 (West 2002)).
193. This is in contrast to states such as Nebraska and Missouri that define specific
actions a broker can and cannot perform for each relationship.
194. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.606 (West 2002), with Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 339.720-.755, and NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2417.
195. Brown & Grohman, supra note 3, at 55. Mismatched relationships can occur
because "the listing broker began working with the seller before any potential buyer or
buyers had been identified." Id.
196.. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.606, .608 (describing the duties of seller's agents,
buyer's agents and dual agents, and noting this determination has to be made at the
initial interview with each consumer (buyer and seller)). The seller would choose the
relationship at (or before) the time the property is listed, while the buyer would choose
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more complicated if a broker has previously represented this buyer in
showing him other properties.'
1 97
In addition to the confusion of mismatched relationships, there is
the potential for confusion of responsibilities. As one commentator
noted, "how could brokers keep their different relationships and varying
responsibilities straight?"' 98 If a broker becomes confused as to what
responsibilities are owed and when action must be taken, the broker is
potentially liable for violating the broker's duties under the requisite
relationships.
Another consequence of Act 112 is that it conflicts with the
realities brokers face in trying to obtain customers. The broker must
disclose the agency relationship possibilities at the initial interview, 99
when the broker is trying to get the consumer to become a customer and
is trying to develop a rapport with the consumer.200  The broker is
competing for consumers' business against other brokers who may be
willing to enter into a different agency relationship where the consumer
201could get more representation for the money. In short, following the
law may not be good for business. This consequence could have been
avoided with a simpler disclosure like the one recommended by PAR,
which wanted the initial disclosure to just make consumers aware of
202their rights and of whom, if anyone, the broker currently represents.
More detail could follow at a later time.
Many consumers want the disclosure to be abbreviated as well.
They do not want to hear a long explanation or sign forms; they want to
see or ask questions about the property.203 Also, consumers are hesitant
to sign the acknowledgement of disclosure because it looks too much
like a contract. 204 This is especially true considering that right after the
disclosure notice, the consumer can enter into a contract with the
broker. 20 5 Many consumers could confuse the two documents. The
when the broker would look or show a property to him.
197. Id.
198. Brown & Grohman, supra note 3, at 55.
199. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.608.
200. Brown & Grohman, supra note 3, at 55. Brokers are "trying to explain their
limited responsibility as facilitators or the complications of dual agency while
simultaneously trying to get business, i.e., induce buyers or sellers to become their
customers." Id.
201. Id Because there were no suggestions that facilitator-brokers should be or
were reducing their commissions to reflect their reduced responsibilities." Id.
202. Agency Hearing, supra note 30.
203. Pennsylvania Agency, supra note 95.
204. Jarboe, supra note 13, at 38 (noting that the Kansas disclosure form, which also
was not a contract but required a signature to acknowledge receipt was problematic
because "the form looked so much like a contract that many consumers distrusted it").
205. 49 PA. CODE § 35.336 (2002).
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unwillingness of some to sign even the acknowledgement is evidenced
by the 2000 amendments, which allow brokers to note when a buyer
206will not sign.
Yet another problem is that the dual agency relationship
established by Act 112 presents a conflict of interest since the broker is
working for two opposing parties.2 °7 As Governor Ridge pointed out,
and commentators from other states have noted, dual agency is an
inherent conflict of interest. 208 Other states that have adopted dual
agency have repealed it for this very reason.
Act 112 is also too far-reaching. The Act was created to aid the
average consumer who may not understand which party the broker
represents, 20 9 but it does not make sense to apply the Act to commercial
transactions. Act 112 was not designed for the commercial consumer,
and it does not adapt well to commercial situations. If the legislature
decides that some provisions are necessary for commercial consumers,
provisions should be designed to fit commercial needs.
Finally, Act 112 fails to comply with several of NAR's
recommendations that would protect both brokers and consumers.
21°
For example, since the law does not abrogate the common law of dual
agency, a broker could follow the statutory guidelines and a court could
still find the broker liable under common law rules.211 In addition, there
is no default relationship established, such as transactional licensee.
Therefore, consumers are forced to choose a relationship at the initial
interview,212 then most likely sign a contract for a relationship that they
may not understand. Otherwise, they have no representation at all.
B. Possible Amendments to Act 112
Because no other options are viable, the best approach for
Pennsylvania to correct the consequences of Act 112 is through further
amendments. Some of the many nonworkable options are provided
below. First, changing the current consumer notice form would not be
an adequate solution because if the form was shorter it could not
describe the law fully, 213 and if it gave more description it could
206. Act of June 22, 2000, P.L. 371, 2000 Pa. Laws 47 (codified as amended at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 455.101-.701 (West 2002)).
207. Gov Signs Agency Law, with Warning, supra note 89.
208. Id.; Brady, supra note 111; Pendergrass, supra note 91.
209. 1998 PA. HOUSE LEGIS. JOURNAL 1467 (1999).
210. NAT'L Ass'N OF REALTORS, supra note 5.
211. Id.
212. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.608 (West 2002).
213. Id. Act 112 provides for a list of items that must be included in the disclosure.
Id. The form could not be simpler without the law's requirements becoming simpler.
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confuse consumers further. Second, trying to educate consumers before
they are prepared to buy or to sell real estate is also inadequate because
it is unlikely that they will retain knowledge of real estate agencies until
it pertains to them personally. Third, educating brokers further will
also not correct the problems, as they will still have the potential for
liability since there are so many requirements to follow with scant
guidelines. No approach short of amendment could correct problems
with Act 112 since they are inherent problems with the law itself.
Pennsylvania needs to follow the lead of states like Florida by repealing
dual agency and making disclosure a two-step process that reflects the
business practice.
First, an amendment must be passed to repeal dual agency. No
matter what provisions are adopted to disclose the relationship to
consumers, it will always be a conflict of interest, for, as the courts
have stated: "No man can serve two masters." 214 A broker cannot fully
be loyal to one party while also being loyal to the adverse party.
Without dual agency, the choices for representation become clear.
For a seller, the choice is between representation (seller's agent) or just
performance of services (transactional licensee). A buyer, when
viewing a property, can choose to be represented with a buyer's agent,
to have no agent, or to employ a transactional licensee to perform
services alone. In any event, a broker must disclose to consumers
whom the broker represents.
Simplifying the law will make disclosure much less complex,
although it most still occur at the appropriate time, which may not
necessarily be the initial interview. The law should consider the reality
of the real estate business in that brokers are trying to establish a
rapport with customers and therefore do not want to scare or confuse a
customer with a detailed form right from the start.21 5  The
Commonwealth could amend the disclosure provisions by letting the
brokers adopt the forms to fit their needs, like Nebraska, or by allowing
the initial disclosure to be a short statement of whom the broker does
and does not represent, like Florida. More detailed disclosure could
come later when the consumer is prepared to enter into a contract with
the broker. A two-tiered disclosure more adequately reflects the nature
of the industry.
Another possible amendment to Act 112 is an explicit provision to
displace the common law of agency in real estate. Even though Act
112 does define agency relationships in an attempt to abrogate common
law, an explicit provision would provide brokers with even more
214. Onorato v. Wissahickon Park, Inc., 244 A.2d 22, 25 (Pa. 1968).
215. Brown & Grohman, supra note 3, at 55.
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protection so that they could not be held liable under common law
when they have met the requirements of statutory law.
In addition, Act 112 should be amended to provide a default
relationship so that the consumer has some representation if no contract
has been formed. With a default relationship, a consumer does not have
to be left completely unrepresented if the consumer does not wish to
enter into a contractual relationship at a certain time.
Finally, because the Act should focus on the consumers who it was
designed to protect, an amendment should be added to exclude
commercial transactions. The law is over-burdensome for larger
commercial transactions, and does not serve its intended purpose of
informing consumers who may not understand the law.
VI. Conclusion
Viewing a property or trying to sell your home does not have to
begin with real estate Miranda rights or be as complex as a law school
course in agency law. Consumers need to understand who has
representation in a transaction. However, inundating them with
complex disclosures early on and a buffet of varying levels of
representation adds only confusion instead of clarity.
Under the current agency and disclosure scheme of Act 112, the
needs of consumers and brokers are not being met. The law should be
amended to prohibit dual agency while simplifying the disclosure to
consumers. Thousands of consumers consult with brokers on a daily
basis in Pennsylvania. These consumers must be made aware of their
rights in a format that everyone can understand. Brokers, too, must
understand their duties and not be placed in situations that are
inherently a conflict of interest.
With some modifications, such as making Act 112's disclosures
more concise and limiting agency relationships, Act 112 can offer
consumers the protection they deserve without the confusion, and
brokers the options they need without increased liability.
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